frequency within host that are usually discarded, and combines it with epidemiological information of host exposure to infection. This leads to accurate reconstruction of transmission even in cases where abundant within-host pathogen genetic variation and weak transmission bottlenecks (multiple pathogen units colonising a new host at transmission) would otherwise make inference difficult due to the transmission history differing from the pathogen evolution history inferred from pathogen isolets. Also, the use of within-host pathogen genomic variants increases the resolution of the reconstruction of the transmission tree even in scenarios with limited within-outbreak pathogen genetic diversity: within-host pathogen populations that appear identical at the level of consensus sequences can be discriminated using within-host variants. Our Bayesian approach provides a measure of the confidence in different possible transmission histories, and is published as open source software. We show with simulations and with an analysis of the beginning of the 2014 Ebola outbreak that our approach is applicable in many scenarios, improves our understanding of transmission dynamics, and will contribute to finding and limiting sources and routes of transmission, and therefore preventing the spread of infectious disease. 15 epidemiological relatedness of hosts, and can bias estimates of infection times [12, 13] . 16 In recent years a number of methods have been proposed explicitly modelling both 17 the transmission process and within-host pathogen genetic evolution to infer 18 transmission events [11, [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] . Some of these methods use epidemiological data and 19 genetic sequences from pathogen samples, and ignore within-host evolution and other 20 causes of phylogenetic discordance with transmission history [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [21] [22] [23] . Methods 21 that explicitly model pathogen evolution within hosts and within an 22 outbreak [13, 20, 24, 25, 27] generally assume, among other things, that samples provide 23 individual and reliable pathogen haplotypes. This is often true for bacteria that are 24 sampled and cultured before being sequenced, but it is mostly false for viruses and 25 bacteria that are sequenced directly from samples without culturing. In fact, in these 26 cases the sequencing process delivers reads coming from the different pathogen 27 haplotypes that constitute the within-host pathogen population, and it is often very 28 hard (if not impossible) to reconstruct complete haplotypes from these reads. In such 29 cases, within-sample genetic variation is often neglected, and a single haplotype (which 30 we call the consensus sequence of the sample) is built. While this procedure might lead 31 to biases, it also certainly discards a very informative part of the available genetic data, 32 because within-sample genetic variants can be very informative of epidemiological 33 distance, direction of transmission, time from infection and transmission bottleneck 34 2 intensity (see [29] [30] [31] [32] and Figure 1 ). Furthermore, it is generally assumed that the 35 pathogen does not recombine, so that a single phylogeny describes the evolutionary 36 history of the whole genome, but this assumption does not fit highly recombinant 37 pathogens such as HIV [33] . For these reasons, a few approaches have recently been 38 proposed that use within-host genetic variants to reconstruct transmission [30, 32] . 39 Here, we propose a new Bayesian approach called BadTrIP (BAyesian 40 epiDemiological TRansmission Inference from Polymorphisms) that not only uses 41 within-sample genetic variants (from possibly multiple samples per host) to reconstruct 42 transmission (including directionality and time of infection), but also combines this 43 information with epidemiological data and an explicit model of within-host pathogen 44 population evolution and transmission. We use the phylogenetic models with 45 polymorphisms PoMo [36] [37] [38] to model population evolution along branches of the 46 transmission tree; thanks to this, our transmission tree and phylogenetic tree are the 47
Pathogen genome sequencing can reveal details of transmission histories and is a powerful tool in the fight against infectious disease. In particular, within-host pathogen genomic variants identified through heterozygous nucleotide base calls are a potential source of information to identify linked cases and infer direction and time of transmission. However, using such data effectively to model disease transmission presents a number of challenges, including differentiating genuine variants from those observed due to sequencing error, as well as the specification of a realistic model for within-host pathogen population dynamics.
Here we propose a new Bayesian approach to transmission inference, BadTrIP (BAyesian epiDemiological TRansmission Inference from Polymorphisms), that explicitly models evolution of pathogen populations in an outbreak, transmission (including transmission bottlenecks), and sequencing error. BadTrIP enables the inference of host-to-host transmission from pathogen sequencing data and epidemiological data. By assuming that genomic variants are unlinked, our method does not require the computationally intensive and unreliable reconstruction of individual haplotypes. Using simulations we show that BadTrIP is robust in most scenarios and can accurately infer transmission events by efficiently combining information from genetic and epidemiological sources; thanks to its realistic model of pathogen evolution and the inclusion of epidemiological data, BadTrIP is also more accurate than existing approaches. BadTrIP is distributed as an open source package (https://bitbucket.org/nicofmay/badtrip) for the phylogenetic software BEAST2.
We apply our method to reconstruct transmission history at the early stages of the 2014 Ebola outbreak, showcasing the power of within-host genomic variants to reconstruct transmission events.
Author Summary
We present a new tool to reconstruct transmission events within outbreaks. Our approach makes use of pathogen genetic information, notably genetic variants at low Introduction 1 Understanding transmission is important for devising effective policies and measures 2 that limit the spread of infectious diseases. In recent years, affordable whole genome 3 sequencing has provided unprecedented detail on the relatedness of pathogen 4 samples [1] [2] [3] [4] . Consequently, accurately inferring transmission between hosts is 5 becoming more feasible. However, this requires robust statistical approaches that make 6 use of the full extent of genetic and epidemiological data available. Here, we present a 7 new approach that makes use of within-host genetic variation and epidemiological data 8 to infer transmission. 9 A number of approaches have been developed that reconstruct transmission from 10 genetic data. The number of substitutions between samples from different hosts can be 11 used to rule out transmission [5] [6] [7] , or the phylogenetic tree of the pathogen samples can 12 be used as a proxy for the transmission history [8, 9] . However, while the phylogenetic 13 signal can be very informative of transmission, it can also be misleading [10, 11] , due to 14 within-host variation that can generate discrepancies between the phylogenetic and same entity, and within-host evolution and recombination (resulting from a single 48 primary infection, not multiple infections) do not create discrepancies that make 49 statistical inference hard and computationally demanding [24, 25, 27] . We also explicitly 50 model transmission bottlenecks, with one parameter defining the intensity of the 51 bottleneck, and therefore the number of pathogen particles that establish a new 52 population at transmission. Another feature of our approach is that, similarly to 53 methods using within-host variants [30, 32] , but differently from most other methods, we 54 assume different genomic positions are unlinked; as such, our approach is expected to 55 work well when recombination is strong enough to break linkage between genetic 56 variants in the same host, or when very few high frequency variants and substitutions 57 are expected per case, but could otherwise lead to poorly calibrated (excessively narrow) 58 posterior probability distributions. 59 BadTrIP is implemented as an open-source package for the Bayesian phylogenetic 60 software BEAST2 [39] , and as such, it can be freely installed and used. We compare the 61 performance of BadTrIP and the shared variants-based clustering (SVC) method of [30] 62 on simulated data and on a real dataset from the early stages of the 2014 Ebola 63 outbreak [40] . These applications show that BadTrIP has high accuracy to reconstruct 64 transmission thanks to its explicit model of population evolution, the use of within-host 65 genetic variants, and the inclusion of epidemiological data, and can provide important 66 information to understand and limit the spread of infectious disease.
67
In the rest of the manuscript, we refer to a "host" as any entity that can contain and 68 transmit a pathogen. Typically a host is a human within a community or nosocomial 69 outbreak, or patients, but the concept of host can also be generalised for example to 70 farms within a livestock outbreak. We will refer to the collection of all pathogens of the 71 type under consideration within an individual host at a certain time as a "pathogen 72 population" (for example all Ebola virions within an infected host, excluding non-Ebola 73 pathogens and Ebola virions from other hosts). We will call a "pathogen unit" a single 74 pathogen individual within a population, for example an individual bacterial cell or an 75 individual virion. We call a pathogen population "polymorphic" at a particular genome 76 position if pathogen units with different nucleotides at that position are present in the 77 population; in this case, we also call the considered genome position a "genetic variant". 78
Results

79
Modelling Within-Host Evolution, Transmission, and Methods to reconstruct transmission that account for within-host evolution usually have 82 to deal with the complex task of modelling and inferring the discrepancies between the 83 Figure 1 . Examples of informativeness of within-host genetic variants. Here we show how within-host within-sample genetic variants can be useful without requiring pathogen haplotypes. Each string of letters (a frequency sequence logo [34, 35] ) represents the collective genome of the pathogen at a certain point in time, as could be observed through deep sequencing. Multiple letters in the same column represent a genetic variant, with letter size representing allelic abundance. Time is on the Y axis, hosts are represented as black rectangles (a host is only active in the outbreak for the portion of vertical axis it occupies), and plausible transmission events as arrows. The posterior probability of different transmission events is represented by the arrow thickness. The number of little circles within arrows represents the inoculum size (transmission bottleneck). A) Shared genetic variants hint to epidemiological relatedness: the two top hosts (H1 and H2) are both possible infectors of the central host (H3), but H2 shares two genetic variants with H3, making it a likely infector of H3. Furthermore, the presence of shared genetic variants suggests a large transmission inoculum (a weak transmission bottleneck). B) A genetic variant of the same type of a substitution can hint to an infector: as before, but now H3 has a substitution (at third genome position, from T to C), which means that its within-host population is non-polymorphic at this position, but with a different nucleotide than the index case. This substitution is between the two nucleotides present at the same position in H2 (where this position is a genetic variant), consistent with H2 being the infector of H3. Also, this time the absence of shared genetic variants is indicative of a small transmission inoculum (a strong transmission bottleneck). C-D) The number of new genetic variants is informative of the age of an infection (but possibly also of the history of the pathogen population size within the host): in C the presence of non-shared variants in H2 suggests that the infection is older, while in D their absence suggests that the infection is younger. transmission tree and the pathogen phylogenetic trees [13, 20, 24, 25, 27] . We avoid this 84 complication by adopting and adapting a substitution model, PoMo [36] [37] [38] , that 85 describes population evolution along the branches of a species (or population) tree. In 86 this model, a virtual population, similar to a Moran model [41] without selection and 87 with fixed population size, evolves by accumulating random changes in nucleotide 88 frequencies (genetic drift, eventually resulting in the fixation of polymorphic sites), and 89 new mutations resulting in new polymorphic sites. Different genome positions are 90 modelled as completely unlinked.
91
The adoption of such a population genetic model within a transmission tree 92 structure means that the phylogenetic tree and the transmission tree are now the same 93 entity, and that each point of the tree represents the state of the pathogen population at 94 a certain time within a host ( Figure 2 ). Each bifurcation in the tree represents a 95 transmission event, where the pathogen population splits in two groups: one remaining 96 in the current host, and a small sub-population colonising a new host. We use a 97 population bottleneck at time of transmission for the colonising branch to better model 98 the transmission process.
99
Our method uses two sources of information: epidemiological and genetic data.
100
Epidemiological data is in the form of dates: the times when genetic samples are 101 collected (it is possible to give any number of samples ≥ 0 for any host, even no sample 102 at all) and a time interval for each host describing when it can contribute to the 103 outbreak. Each host can only be infected, be sampled, and can infect other hosts within 104 its time interval [13] . Genetic data from each sample is in the form of nucleotide counts: 105 for each position of the genome, for a certain sample, the model expects the number of 106 times each of the four nucleotides is observed in the reads (for example: 59 As, 0 Cs, 12 107 Gs, 1 Ts). We assume that reads are sampled with replacement from the pathogen 108 population according to the (hidden) true nucleotide frequencies, and we model the 109 sequencing error. This in particular means that sites without any sequencing coverage, 110 or with very low coverage, are also allowed, and that differently from similar approaches 111 (i.e. [30, 32] ) we don't required the specification of a minimum genetic variant frequency 112 threshold.
113
While in our model we make the strong assumption that sites are completely 114 unlinked, we test the performance of our approach with simulations in which we 115 explicitly model within-host recombination events and we assume that a limited number 116 of individuals in the pathogen population is sequenced. We even simulate scenarios in 117 the total absence of recombination (complete linkage) to measure the robustness of our 118 method. We simulate a broad range of scenarios: different transmission bottleneck 119 severities (weak vs. strong), different amounts of genetic information, different 120 recombination and mutation rates, different sequencing coverage levels, different 121 sequencing error rates, and different virtual population sizes. We give further details on 122 the model used and the simulations in the Materials and Methods section.
123
Accuracy of Inference on Simulated Data
124
To test the accuracy of our new method BadTrIP in inferring transmission events, and 125 to compare it to previous methods [30] , we simulated pathogen evolution within 126 outbreaks and sample sequencing, and we used different methods to reconstruct the 127 transmission history from sequencing and epidemiological data. To simulate pathogen 128 evolution, first we simulated an outbreak using SEEDY [42] (we used a fixed population 129 of 15 hosts, one initial case, and an infection/recovery rate ratio of 1.43, see Materials 130 and Methods); then, we translated the transmission history into a population history, 131 and simulated within-population pathogen coalescent, recombination and mutation with 132 fastsimcoal2 [43] . Throughout the simulations each host in the outbreak is sampled 133 exactly once. We measure the accuracy of a method as the frequency with which the 134 Figure 2 . Graphical representation of the transmission, evolution and sequencing model. Here we describe some key aspects of our model. The figure depicts a possible evolutionary outcome for one position of the pathogen genome and the given transmission history. There are three hosts in this outbreak, represented by the black rectangles: H1 infects H2, which in turn infects H3. Time is on the vertical axis, and transmission events are represented by the thick arrows between hosts. Within each host, while it is colonised, the pathogen population consists of 15 units, each of which can have one of the four nucleotides at the considered position and at any time. For example, H1 starts off with all 15 pathogen units having an A, but during infection one of them mutates to C, and through genetic drift when H1 infects H2 it has 4 C's and 11 A's. While instantaneously only small changes can occur (one pathogen unit changing its nucleotide), along a time interval any number of changes can occur. As H2 is infected by H1, H2 is colonised by a copy of the pathogen population of H1, but the transmission bottleneck in this case causes one of the nucleotides to be lost, so that H2 is founded by a homogenous population of A's. Within H2 again a mutation occurs and now a G is present in the pathogen population, but when H3 is colonised by H2 both nucleotides survive the transmission bottleneck, so H3 starts off with a polymorphic population. In the figure, H1 and H3 both have samples extracted and sequenced once, while H2 is not sampled at all. The sequencing process can result in any coverage (24 for H1 and 7 for H3 at the considered position). Furthermore, the observed nucleotide frequencies don't necessarily exactly match the real nucleotides frequencies due to the randomness of read sampling, and because sequencing error can cause absent nucleotides to be observed at very low frequencies.
correct transmission source is inferred to be the most likely a posteriori. We also give a 135 measure of the calibration of different methods by counting how often the correct source 136 is in the 95% posterior credible set, defined as the minimum set of sources with 137 cumulative probability ≥ 95% such that all sources in the set have higher posterior 138 probability than all sources outside of it.
139
BadTrIP shows elevated accuracy in detecting the correct source of transmission 140 (between 50% and 90%) and calibration (between 80% and 100%), in particular 141 compared to the SVC approach (accuracy between 20% and 45% and calibration 142 between 45% and 95%), see Figure 3 . This shows that the use of epidemiological data 143 and an explicit model of evolution can help to reconstruct transmission. In particular, 144 comparing the base scenario with the one with almost no mutation, we see that 145 BadTrIP accuracy drops from about 80% to about 50%, while the SVC accuracy drops 146 from slightly more than 30% to about 20%; these drops approximately represent the 147 contribution given by genetic data to the inference of transmission, while the difference 148 between the two methods at almost no mutation (about 50% versus about 20%) shows 149 the contribution of epidemiological information. Calibration of both methods increases 150 as mutation rate decreases, one probable contributing factor being that as mutation rate 151 decreases the effect of genetic linkage on the pathogen evolutionary dynamics decreases 152 (neither method models genetic linkage). Similarly, the complete absence of 153 recombination negatively affects calibration, but the difference is not dramatic (from 154 about 90% to about 80% for BadTrIP, and even less for SVC) suggesting that even in 155 the worst case scenario of complete absence of recombination BadTrIP can still provide 156 meaningful inference and posterior distributions. Accuracy decreases with decreasing 157 mutation rate, as is expected because of the reduced genetic information. However, 158 increasing mutation rates to very high levels (to the point that about half the genome, 159 of length 5kb, is polymorphic within the outbreak) does not seem to improve inference, 160 probably because of saturation. Accuracy seems higher (around 10% difference) in the 161 presence of a strong bottleneck (small inoculum) than a weak bottleneck (large 162 inoculum), while calibration seems almost unaffected; this probably happens because, 163 with strong bottlenecks polymorphisms are unlikely shared between hosts, and so 164 polymorphisms leading to substitutions (see Figure 1B ) become more informative for 165 identifying infectors. An increase in coverage (from 40x to 100x) does not seem to bring 166 improvement in accuracy or calibration; on the other hand, when a single uniform 167 colony is sequenced (which is equivalent to reducing coverage to 1x, and therefore 168 removing information on within-host genetic variation) seems to moderately reduce 169 accuracy (≈ 10%) but not calibration. Introducing sequencing error (0.2% of mis-called 170 bases, slightly more than what typical for high-throughput DNA sequencing [44] ) 171 accompanied by reduced coverage (20x) and genome length (1kb) still resulted in 172 elevated accuracy (72.5%) and calibration (97.5%). Increasing the PoMo virtual 173 population size (from 15 to 25, while the actual simulated population size remains 1000) 174 had negligible effects on the inference.
175
BadTrIP also infers the time of infection. Calibration seems to increase with 176 recombination, and to decrease with mutation ( Figure 4 ), probably again an effect of 177 our assumption of no linkage. Also, very high mutation rates seem to reduce the error 178 in time inference, as do high coverage and virtual population size.
179
The running time of BadTrIP is affected by the number of genetic variants present 180 in the alignment and by the number of hosts present in the outbreak ( Figure S1 ). The 181 number of variants affect the number of likelihoods that need to be calculated at each 182 MCMC step, while the number of hosts affects the size of the transmission/population 183 tree (so both the computational and statistical complexity of BadTrIP). However, the 184 time required to complete an analysis is not always a linear function of these two 185 quantities: at low mutation rates BadTrIP requires similar times for different outbreak 186 Figure 3 . Accuracy and calibration of BadTrIP on simulated data. A) We represent accuracy as the frequency with which the correct simulated transmission event is more likely a posteriori than the alternatives. B) Calibration is the frequency with which the correct transmission event is in the 95% posterior credible set (the minimum set of sources with cumulative probability ≥ 95% such that all sources in the set have higher posterior probability than all sources outside of it). Bars represent percentages (from 0, worst, to 100, best) for BadTrIP (red) and the shared variants-based clustering (SVC) approach [30] (azure). On the x axis are different simulation scenarios with the first one, "base", being the basic simulation scenario with 10-15 cases per outbreak, about 300-500 SNPs among all hosts, recombination 10 times stronger than mutation, complete bottleneck (no transmission of within-host genetic variants), read coverage of 40x, PoMo virtual population size of 15, actual pathogen population size of 1000, and genome size of 5 kb. All other scenarios are obtained from the base one changing one or two parameters: in "no recombination" the recombination rate is set to 0; in "high recombination" the recombination rate is 10 times higher; in "high mutation" the mutation rate is 10 times higher resulting in 2000-3000 SNPs per outbreak; in "low mutation" the mutation rate is 10 times lower resulting in 30-50 SNPs per outbreak; in "very low mutation" the mutation rate is 1000 times lower, resulting in 0-1 SNPs per outbreak; in "weak bottleneck" at transmission 5 pathogen units from the infector colonised the infected host, instead of just 1; in "high rec. weak bott." both the recombination rate is 10 times higher and the founding population at transmission is made of 5 pathogen particles; in "high coverage" read coverage in sequencing is 100x instead of 40x; in "1x coverage" read coverage in sequencing is 1x instead of 40x; in "sequencing error" 0.2% of read bases are randomly modified to simulate sequencing error, coverage is reduced to 20x, and genome size is reduced to 1kb; in "high N" the PoMo virtual population size is 25 instead of 15. Figure 3 .
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Error (days) Calibration sizes. The reason is probably that with less data there is more uncertainty (in particular 187 in the posterior distribution of the mutation rate), and so it takes longer to explore the 188 the parameter space effectively. Overall, it takes a few hours to completely investigate 189 an outbreak of moderate size (one or two dozen hosts) with BadTrIP.
190
Analysis of the Early 2014 Ebola Outbreak in Sierra Leone
191
To demonstrate the applicability of BadTrIP and the advantage of using a model that 192 combines epidemiological and within-sample genetic variation data, we use BadTrIP to 193 infer transmission within the early cases of the 2014 Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone. 194 We use data published by Gire and colleagues [40] and previously analysed with the 195 SVC method by Worby and colleagues [30] . One of the factors that make this dataset 196 important to this study is the presence of within-host variants shared by multiple hosts, 197 with one genetic variant that was even shared by eleven hosts [40] . and as such we expect to see a lot of uncertainty in the inference [30] ; furthermore, all 206 the samples were collected over a time interval of two months, and we assume 207 transmission from a host to be possible from three weeks prior to three weeks following 208 the sample collection, so the epidemiological data are also not very informative. Indeed, 209 we see that most of the cases are inferred by BadTrIP to have a flat distribution of 210 possible infectors, with highest per-infectee values generally under 30% posterior 211 probability ( Figure 5 ). However, we also see that BadTrIP identifies some pairs of 212 infector-infectee with very high posterior probabilities ( Figure S2 ). These pairs not only 213 generally fit with the geographical epidemiological data, with most transmission with 214 posterior probability > 50% happening within chiefdoms (with two exceptions discussed 215 later), but also with the SVC inference [30] . Of these, transmission from EM119 to 216 G3770 was inferred by Worby and colleagues [30] using consensus sequence genetic 217 distance, while transmission from EM096 to G3679, from G3826 to G3827, from G3820 218 to G3838, from EM110 to G3809, and from G3729 to G3795 was inferred with the help 219 of shared within-host genetic variants. All highly likely transmission pairs in [30] are 220 also inferred by BadTrIP, but there are some highly likely transmission events inferred 221 by BadTrIP that were not detected by SVC. For example, transmission from G3834 to 222 G3817 is inferred by BadTrIP and is supported by a 3% frequency variant within G3834 223 that becomes fixed in G3817; however, such a variant fixation, attributable to the 224 transmission dynamics described in Figure 1B , is not informative in the SVC 225 method [30] and was further ignored due to the imposition of a 5% variant frequency 226 threshold that we could avoid thanks to our explicit model of sequence evolution and 227 sequencing error. Other cases similar to the latter are the inferred transmissions from 228 EM110 to G3856, from EM110 to G3822, and from EM111 to G3724. them had a high probability in [30] , but they are both supported by low-frequency 234 variants becoming fixed in the recipient.
235
Our inference of the sequencing error rate is extremely low (2 · 10 −7 < < 7 · 10 −7 ) 236 consistent with the thorough filtering steps adopted by Gire and colleagues [40] prior to 237 within-host variant calling.
238
Discussion
239
Methods to infer transmission histories within outbreaks are important to determine the 240 causes of transmission, to predict the most probable sources in the future, and therefore 241 to inform policies preventing and limiting transmission. Genomic pathogen data from 242 samples collected within an outbreak give the opportunity to observe at an 243 unprecedented level of detail the genetic relatedness of pathogens from different cases. 244 However, it is very hard to reconstruct the complete genome sequences of different 245 pathogen units within the same host, even when sequencing output and read accuracy 246 are elevated. The reason is that individual reads are generally shorter than the whole 247 pathogen genome, and different reads usually come from different pathogen units.
248
Within-host recombination, within-host mutation, and weak transmission bottleneck in 249 fact cause the within-host pathogen population to be genetically varied. Within-host 250 pathogen haplotype reconstruction is generally possible only when few high-frequency 251 and diverged haplotypes are present, such as in the case of bacterial mixed infections 252 with two diverged pathogen populations [45] , or when within-host mutation is very 253 high [46] . However, most methods to infer transmission from pathogen genetic data 254 require full haplotypes, leading in many cases to loss of information (the within-sample 255 genetic diversity) and consensus bias.
256
In recent years two methods have been proposed to infer transmission using not only 257 genetic distances between consensus sequences, but also information about shared 258 within-sample variants [30, 32] . In fact, within-host variants can be very informative 259 regarding past transmission events (Figure 1 ), but it is not simple to accurately model 260 pathogen population evolution within outbreaks and pathogen population sequencing. 261 Here we present BadTrIP, a Bayesian approach to transmission inference that not only 262 makes use of information regarding within-sample variants, but also implements an 263 explicit model of pathogen population evolution within outbreak that allows inference of 264 transmission direction and time, and allows the inclusion of epidemiological data that 265 can further refine the inference of plausible transmission events. Compared to other 266 similar methods [30, 32] , our approach has the advantage of implementing an explicit (BEAST2 [39] ). Using simulations, we show that our approach achieves higher accuracy 272 and calibration than SVC [30] , and can reliably individuate likely transmission histories. 273 Also, using a dataset of the early 2014 Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, and making use 274 of information of within-sample variation and its evolution model, BadTrIP could 275 individuate previously unidentified likely transmission events, including transmissions 276 between geographic locations.
277
Despite these results, BadTrIP also has limitations, for example its model of genetic 278 linkage. By assuming that all sites are unlinked, our model could be poorly calibrated 279 in cases where there is no within-host recombination but high within-host mutation, 280 causing strong correlations between inherited variants that are not expected in our 281 model. However, we show in our simulations that our method is robust in a large 282 variety of scenarios, including in the absence of recombination and with reads coming 283 from few pathogen units. Another limitation is that our approach is generally not fast 284 enough to deal with very large datasets, and, at the current stage, application is 285 recommended to outbreaks with fewer than 100 cases. Also, BadTrIP is only applicable 286 to the case where all hosts in the outbreak have been sampled, or at least observed.
287
While this assumption is very common among transmission inference 288 methods [11, 14-20, 23-26, 28] it also limits their applicability. Inferring possible 289 non-sampled and non-observed intermediate hosts would probably lead to a significant 290 increase in the statistical complexity and computational demand of BadTrIP (but 291 see [13, 27] ). Another scenario that is not accounted for in our model and should be 292 therefore watched for is multiple infections of the same host (one host being infected by 293 multiple sources, or from the same source multiple times). Another similarly looking 294 and equally concerning problem is potential sample contamination. We recommend 295 sequencing data to be searched for possible contaminations and multiple infections using 296 methods such as PHYLOSCANNER [47] prior to be investigated with BadTRiP. We 297 have also not accounted for selective pressure, which could sometimes introduce biases, 298 for example creating homoplasies due to the same mutation appearing multiple times in 299 different hosts, or the same polymorphism being maintained by balancing selection.
300
However, our approach weighs information from both fixed substitutions and 301 polymorphic variants, so the same mutation appearing in different genetic backgrounds 302 will not be as nearly as biasing as for the SVC method. Furthermore, as our model is 303 implemented in BEAST2, it is possible to specify a broad range of models of genomic 304 variation in substitution rates which could at least partly account for the effects of 305 selection. Finally, it is possible that errors in the bioinformatic processing of reads, for 306 example mapping errors, cause the identification of the same spurious genetic variants 307 in multiple hosts. We therefore encourage the investigations of genetic variants shard by 308 many hosts to assess their biological plausibility. In the future we will work to solve 309 some of the limitations of BadTrIP, in particular to reduce its computational demand 310 and to model non-sampled non-observed hosts.
311
In conclusion, we have presented a new method that addresses the urgent need for information on host d exposure is provided, it is assumed that d is exposed for the 330 whole outbreak (d i = +∞ and d r = −∞). We will denote as E the collection of 331 exposure times.
332
Each host-deme starts off as non-colonised and is colonised (infected) at some time 333 t d between d i and the time that the first sample is collected from d (if no sample is 334 collected from d, then we require only t d > d r ). Also, unless d is the first host to be 335 infected in the outbreak, d is infected by another host in the outbreak I d = d, such that 336 I dr < t d < t I d , that is, d is infected after I d is infected, but before I d reaches its removal 337 time. If d is indeed the first case of the outbreak, then I d is assigned the ∅ (we assume 338 ∅ / ∈ D). We assume for simplicity that transmission between any pair of hosts and at 339 any time is equally likely, as long as it is consistent with the epidemiological data.
340
Each host is also provided with a (possibly empty) set of samples, S d . Each sample s 341 consists of a sampling time t s and genetic data G s . Each sample s in S d has to be 342 collected after d is infected (t s < t d ) and before d is removed (t s > d r ). Assuming that 343 the genome is L bases long, then the genetic data G s of every sample s has to be in the 344 form of a list of L quadruples, with for example the quadruple for genome position i 345 being G si = (a i , c i , g i , t i ), the four positive natural values being the numbers of A's, C's, 346 G's and T's observed at position i in the sample. If there is no read mapping to position 347 i in sample s, then its quadruple is simply G si = (0, 0, 0, 0). We denote the set of all 348 sequencing data as G. (1) P (µ) and P (B) are the prior probabilities for respectively the substitution model 359 and the bottleneck size, which can be chosen arbitrarily by the user. Instead, we ignore 360 the prior for the transmission tree P (T |E) as in [13] . P (G|T, µ, B) is the likelihood of 361 the sequences given the genealogy and substitution model, and can be calculate as 362 described below, using an adaptation of [36] [37] [38] to transmission trees. So once we 363 calculate the likelihood P (G|T, µ, B) , we can use equation1 with an MCMC to infer a 364 posterior distribution of infection times, infectors, bottleneck size and substitution 365 model parameters.
366
Model of Pathogen Evolution
367
Here, we make use of a phylogenetic model for population evolution, PoMo [36] [37] [38] , to 368 model mutation and drift in the within-host pathogen populations; also, we extend the 369 model to include transmission bottlenecks and sequencing errors. Sequence evolution is 370 usually modelled along phylogenetic trees, which can differ from the transmission 371 tree [13] . However, PoMo describes evolution along species (or population) trees, and 372 the population tree of a pathogen within an outbreak corresponds to the transmission 373 tree T described in the previous section. If we consider the pathogen community within 374 a host d as a population, we see that this population exists from time of infection t d ,
375
when it originates from a split with the population of its infector I d . So, transmission 376 events corresponds to timed splits in the population tree, similar to the bifurcations of a 377 species tree. However, one difference is that the split is asymmetrical, as we assume that 378 the pathogen population size is not affected at t d in I d , but at the start of the branch 379 leading to d it undergoes a bottleneck of intensity B. All events in the tree are timed in 380 real time (e.g., days) with some values fixed (for samples) and some values inferred in 381 the MCMC (infection times).
382
We use a procedure very similar to the Felsenstein pruning algorithm [49] to calculate 383 the likelihood of the genetic data over the tree. First of all, the substitution process 384 along the branches of the transmission-population tree is not a simple DNA substitution 385 process, but is similar to a 4-allelic Moran model [41] with mutation. We assume we 386 have a continuous-time Markov process along each branch of the tree, where the state 387 space is not made by the four nucleotides, as is typical, but by all 1-and 2-allelic states 388 possible for a population of N units. Typical values of N that we use here are 15 or 25, 389 that is, we describe evolution of a large population (possibly with billions of units) with 390 a small virtual population of N units. Such an approximation generally lead to 391 reasonably good results as long as we rescale the mutation rates between the real and 392 the virtual population [36] [37] [38] . N here is not estimated, but is fixed by the user. Lower 393 values of N are expected to reduce the computational demand of the method, but can 394 result in lower accuracy. The states of our Markov process always include the four fixed 395 states, where only one nucleotide is present in the population. In addition, they also and contains N − 1 states: if the two nucleotides present in the population are n 1 and 400 n 2 , then such N − 1 states are the ones in which the population contains i times 401 nucleotide n 1 and N − i times nucleotide n 2 , for 0 < i < N . So in total our state space 402 is of size 4 + 6(N − 1). Our substitution rate matrix is sparse, in that we only allow one 403 unit in the virtual population to change at the time. So, from a fixed state with 404 nucleotide n 1 , a instantaneous move is only possible to one of the three states with 405 N − 1 times nucleotide n 1 and one time any other nucleotide n 2 different from n 1 . Such 406 moves correspond to mutation events, and we represent their rates as µ n1,n2 . Instead, if 407 we are already in a polymorphic state with i times nucleotide n 1 and N − i times 408 nucleotide n 2 , we only allow nucleotide counts to instantaneously change by one, so an 409 instantaneous move is only possible to the state with i + 1 times nucleotide n 1 and 410 N − i − 1 times nucleotide n 2 , or to state i − 1 times nucleotide n 1 and N + 1 − i times 411 nucleotide n 2 (one of these two latter states might be a fixed state). The instantaneous 412 rate at which such changes happen is i(N − i) N 2 R which corresponds to the rate of 413 genetic drift (R represents the rate of drift in the virtual population in units of real 414 time, which will depend on the generation time and is estimated by the model jointly 415 with the other parameters). All other non-diagonal substitution rates are set to 0. All 416 these states and rates constitute the substitution process E.
417
The likelihood of T is calculated starting from the hosts in the outbreaks who don't 418 infect others (the leaves of the transmission tree). For such leaves, the likelihood is first 419 calculated from the latest sample (if no sample is present, then the likelihood of such 420 leaf at time of their transmission is 1 for every state). Given any state of our 421 substitution process with nucleotides n 1 and n 2 with respectively abundances i and 422 N − i in the virtual population (here for generality i can also be 0), given a sample and 423 site at which the nucleotides with the highest coverage are x 1 with coverage c 1 , and x 2 424 with coverage c 2 (we ignore the nucleotides with lower counts for numerical stability), 425 then the likelihood of this state at this sample and site is approximated as:
Where is a parameter describing the sequencing error rate. can be estimated with 427 the other model parameters as we do with the real data and with the simulations process is terminated after the transmission event of the index case, and before its 445 bottleneck we assume state equilibrium frequencies.
446
MCMC operators 447
In addition to typical operator for B, and E, we also define five new operators for 448 updating our transmission-population tree. The first operator modifies the transmission 449 time t d of a host d, without modifying any other parameter, not even the infector I d .
450
The second operator picks a random non-index case d and, without modifying its To test the accuracy of our new method BadTrIP in inferring transmission events, and 461 to compare it with the SVC method [30] , we simulated pathogen evolution within 462 outbreaks and sample sequencing, and we used different methods to reconstruct the 463 transmission history from sequencing and epidemiological data. To simulate pathogen 464 evolution, first we simulated an outbreak using SEEDY [42] with a host population of 465 15 hosts and an infection rate of 0.1 per day, a recovery rate 0.07 per day, a 466 conditionally accepting only outbreaks that achieve a minimum total of 10 infected case. 467 Then, we translated the transmission history into a population history, assuming a 468 within-host pathogen population size of 1000 and using fastsimcoal2 [43] to simulate 469 pathogen coalescent, recombination and mutation with scenario-dependent parameters. 470 Throughout all simulations each host was sampled exactly once. 471 We define a basic group of simulations (called "base"), and nine variants, in each of 472 which one or two aspects of the base group of simulations is modified. In "base" we 473 simulated about 300-500 SNPs (counting also variants present at very low frequency in 474 just one host) or 45 substitutions per outbreak (which might be typical for HIV but 475 high for many other pathogens), recombination rate 10 times higher than the mutation 476 rate, complete bottlenecks (no transmission of within-host genetic variants), 477 homogeneous read coverage of 40x, no sequencing error, PoMo virtual population size of 478 15, all equal mutation rates, and genome size of 5 kb. The nine variant settings are:
479
• no recombination -the recombination rate is set to 0.
480
• high recombination -the recombination rate is increased 10-fold.
481
• high mutation -the mutation rate is 10-fold higher resulting in 2000-3000 SNPs 482 and about 385 substitutions per outbreak.
483
• low mutation -the mutation rate is 10-fold lower resulting in 30-50 SNPs and 484 about 4-5 substituions per outbreak.
485
• very low mutation -the mutation rate is 1000-fold lower, resulting in 0-1 SNPs 486 and 0 substitutions per outbreak.
487
• weak bottleneck -at transmission, 5 pathogen particles from the infector 488 colonise the infected host, instead of just 1.
489
• high recombination and weak bottleneck -the recombination rate is 10-fold 490 higher and the founding population at transmission is made of 5 pathogen 491 particles.
492
• high coverage -read coverage is higher (100x instead of 40x).
493
• 1x coverage -read coverage is extremely low (1x instead of 40x).
494
• sequencing error -read coverage is lower (20x instead of 40x), genome size is 495 reduced (1kb instead of 5kb) and read bases are randomly modified to simulate 496 sequencing error (0.2% of bases in reads are wrong).
497
• high N -the PoMo virtual population size is 25 instead of 15.
498
We ran 10 replicates for all scenarios, and 20 for "base", "weak bottleneck" and "no 499 recombination". We ran the BadTrIP MCMC for 5 · 10 5 steps for each replicate, 500 sampled from the posterior every 100 steps and with a 20% burn-in. We specified in 
505
We measured accuracy as the frequency with which the correct transmission source 506 is inferred by a method to be the most likely a posteriori. We also measured calibration 507 as how often the correct transmission source is the the 95% posterior credible set (the 508 minimum set of sources with cumulative probability ≥ 95% such that all sources in the 509 set have higher posterior probability than all sources outside of it). In addition to 510 performing inference from simulated data with BadTrIP, we also use the SVC 511 method [30] which consists in selecting, for each host, the infector as the one with most 512 shared variants, or, in the absence of shared variants, the one with the smallest 513 consensus genetic distance. If multiple possible infectors score equally, they are assigned 514 the same probability.
515
The 2014 Sierra Leone Ebola Dataset 516 We use sequencing and epidemiological data published by Gire and colleagues [40] and 517 analysed by Worby and colleagues [30] . In particular, we use information from sampling 518 dates, nucleotide frequencies and sequencing coverage. We specify the introduction date 519 (removal date) of each host as its sampling date minus (plus) 21 days. This means that 520 we allow each host to be infected at most 21 days before it being sampled, and to infect 521 others at most 21 days after being sampled. We ran the BadTrIP MCMC until an 522 effective sample size of 1000 was reached for each parameter and for the posterior 
538
Supplementary Text S1 Figure S1 . Computational demand of BadTrIP. Mean computational demand, in seconds, to run 10 5 MCMC steps (blue) and to achieve an effective sample size of 200 for the posterior probability (grey) in BadTrIP. Each barplot represents the mean over 10 simulations. The three rows in the table represent the number of hosts in the simulated outbreaks (3, 5 or 10) and the two columns represent different mutation rates (10 −5 corresponds to the "base" scenario in Figure 3 while 10 −6 corresponds to the "low mutation" scenario in Figure 3 ). On top of each bar is the same running time but represented in minutes ("m") or hours ("h"). Figure S2 . Inference of transmission in the early 2014 Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, only high-probability transmissions. Transmission events with posterior probability higher than 15% as inferred by BadTrIP. The notation is as in Figure 5 
